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E-mail address: giesbrecht@psych.ucsb.edu (B. GieModels of the attentional blink phenomenon (AB) typically assume that unattended information is pro-
cessed to the post-perceptual level prior to selection for access to consciousness. The present experi-
ments test this assumption by manipulating the perceptual load of the ﬁrst target task (T1) and
whether the second target (T2) was the participant’s own name or someone else’s name. In three exper-
iments, increasing T1-load increased the severity of the AB for personal names. The results suggest that
selection during the AB is not ﬁxed at the post-perceptual stage, but rather the stage at which selection
occurs during the AB is ﬂexible.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1 Throughout the present work we used the term selection to refer to a data
reduction process by which a subset of the total amount of information available in
the environment is chosen for detailed analysis (e.g., Vul, Nieuwenstein, & Kanwisher,1. Introduction
Coherent behavior is supported, in part, by attentional mecha-
nisms that afford selective processing of information in the envi-
ronment that is consistent with our current behavioral goals.
Although selective attention has clear beneﬁts that can be mea-
sured in terms of improved behavioral performance and en-
hanced neural activity evoked in response to attended stimuli
(e.g., Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1990;
Heinze et al., 1994; Hillyard, Hink, Schwent, & Picton, 1973; Man-
gun & Hillyard, 1991; Posner, 1980; Van Voorhis & Hillyard,
1977), selective attention also has clear and measurable costs.
For example, when two masked targets are presented in rapid
succession in the same location, correct identiﬁcation of the ﬁrst
target (T1) leads to impaired identiﬁcation of the second target
(T2). This impairment in conscious report of T2, known as the
attentional blink (AB, Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992), lasts
for about 500 ms and it is generally thought to reﬂect the tempo-
ral distribution of the cost of selectively attending to T1, which
renders T2 unattended.
The aim of the present work was to investigate the constraints
on the processing of unattended information presented during
the AB. Determining the extent to which unattended information
is processed has been one of the fundamental issues in the atten-
tion literature (e.g., Allport, 1993) and it has been at the center of
the historical debate between models of attention that posit that
selection occurs early and unattended information is not pro-ll rights reserved.
8. We thank Christie Farson
sbrecht).cessed beyond perceptual stages (e.g., Broadbent, 1958) and mod-
els of attention that suggest that selection occurs late and
unattended information is automatically processed to post-per-
ceptual stages (e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963).1 In contrast to
these classic views, more recent studies of spatial attention have
demonstrated that both perceptual and post-perceptual level selec-
tion can occur, depending on task demands (e.g., Lavie, 1995, 2005;
Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck,
2005; Yantis & Johnston, 1990). Although these studies offer an
important reconciliation to the classic early vs. late selection de-
bate, it is unclear whether changes in the selectivity of attention
with changing task demands are a purely spatial phenomenon.
Here we address this issue by using the AB as a tool to investigate
the inﬂuence of task demands on the perceptual and post-percep-
tual processing of unattended information in the absence of shifts
of spatial attention.
1.1. Evidence for post-perceptual processing during the AB
One of the most consistent ﬁndings in the AB literature is that
despite the severe impairment in conscious report, T2 is processed
to a post-perceptual level. Empirical evidence for extensive pro-
cessing of unattended information during the AB comes from2008). It must be emphasized that the adoption of this generic deﬁnition does not
mean to imply that early/perceptual and late/post-perceptual selection are achieved
by the same mechanism. Indeed, several studies in the literature have suggested that
perceptual and post-perceptual selection are not mediated by a unitary mechanism,
but rather that they are likely mediated by different mechanisms (e.g., Marois et al.,
2004; Vogel et al., 2005; Yi et al., 2004).
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physiological studies showing that T2 is processed to the semantic
level even though it cannot be reported (e.g., Luck, Vogel, & Shap-
iro, 1996; Maki, Frigen, & Paulson, 1997; Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Hen-
ninghausen, 2001; Shapiro, Driver, Ward, & Sorensen, 1997; Vogel,
Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). The ﬁrst published report demonstrating
that information presented during AB is processed to the semantic
level used the event-related potential (ERP) technique to measure
the magnitude of the N400 ERP component evoked by T2 words
(Luck et al., 1996). The N400 ERP component is thought to reﬂect
the outcome of a comparison between current semantic represen-
tations with a previously established context and it is observed as
a large negative deﬂection in the ERP occurring approximately
400 ms after the presentation of a stimulus that violates the
established context (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). For example, the
N400 evoked by the word ‘NURSE’ would be larger if preceded
by the word ‘HORSE’ relative to if ‘NURSE’ had been preceded
by the word ‘DOCTOR’. Luck et al. (1996) used the amplitude of
the N400 component to measure semantic processing of T2 during
the AB and found that the size of the N400 for words presented
during the AB was as large as the N400 for words presented out-
side the AB. Luck et al. (1996) argued that the presence of the
N400 during the AB indicates that T2 was processed to the
post-perceptual level (i.e., fully identiﬁed) and compared to the
context established by the word presented at the beginning of
the trial even though the T2 word could not be reported. The sec-
ond source of evidence typically offered in support post-percep-
tual processing during the AB comes from studies demonstrating
that speciﬁc classes of high-priority information survive the AB
(Mack, Pappas, Silverman, & Gay, 2002; Shapiro, Caldwell, &
Sorensen, 1997). The ﬁrst published report demonstrating that
high-priority information survives the AB revisited the classic
ﬁnding that personal names capture attention (Moray, 1959; Wol-
ford & Morrison, 1980). Shapiro and colleagues (1997) presented
the subject’s own name or someone else’s name as the T2 stimu-
lus and they found that while the detection of someone else’s
name presented during the typical AB window was impaired,
the detection of one’s own name was not.
A variety of theoretical accounts of the AB have been proposed
and each one differs in terms of the explanation of the processing
limitation that results in impaired processing of T2. For instance,
traditional accounts of the AB explain the deﬁcit in T2 report as a
capacity or resource limitation caused by attending to T1 (Chun
& Potter, 1995; Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; Jolicoeur, 1999;
Marois, Yi, & Chun, 2004; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1995; Shap-
iro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1994; Vogel et al., 1998). If T2 is presented
during the period when resources are allocated to T1, the encoding
of T2 is delayed and during this period of delay it is vulnerable to
interference. More recent models have explained the AB not as a
resource limitation, but rather as a failure in conﬁguring the infor-
mation processing system for the second target (Di Lollo, Kawaha-
ra, Ghorashi, & Enns, 2005), a failure in the creation of object-level
representations (Raymond, 2003), or a generalized selection failure
(Olivers & Watson, 2006). Despite the fundamental differences in
the nature of the processing limitation proposed to be at the root
of the AB, these models explain the ﬁnding that semantic informa-
tion survives the AB even though conscious report is impaired by
borrowing from classic late selection theories of attention (e.g.,
Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963). Speciﬁcally, each model assumes that
the AB reﬂects the failure of a post-perceptual selection mecha-
nism that permits unconstrained processing of T2 to a high-level
even though conscious report is impaired (Chun & Potter, 1995;
Di Lollo et al., 2005; Duncan et al., 1994; Jolicoeur, 1999; Marois
et al., 2004; Olivers & Watson, 2006; Raymond, 2003; Shapiro
et al., 1994; Vogel et al., 1998).1.2. Evidence that post-perceptual processing does not always occur
during the AB
While there are numerous demonstrations that T2 is pro-
cessed to a post-perceptual level during the AB, recent evidence
suggests that semantic processing of T2 does not always occur
(Giesbrecht, Sy, & Elliott, 2007; Vachon, Tremblay, & Jones,
2007). For instance, Giesbrecht et al. (2007) manipulated T1 per-
ceptual load using a ﬂanker task (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974)
and measured the context-sensitive N400 event-related potential
(ERP) component evoked by T2 words. When perceptual load was
low, T2 evoked a robust N400 during the typical AB window de-
spite impaired behavioral performance, thus replicating previous
studies of the AB. However, when T1 perceptual load was high,
the magnitude of the N400 during the AB was completely sup-
pressed. In a similar vein, Vachon et al. (2007) recently reported
that when T1 and T2 were semantically related and the tasks re-
quired a change in set, either because the targets were presented
in different locations or because they required different re-
sponses, the extent to which T2 was semantically primed by T1
was reduced. The authors argued that the reduction in the
semantic priming effect reﬂected the fact that the reconﬁguration
processes required to change task sets prevented post-perceptual
processing of T2. When these studies showing attenuated seman-
tic processing during the AB are considered together, they con-
verge on the notion that T2 may not always be processed to
the post-perceptual level.
Although the ﬁnding that post-perceptual processing of T2 does
not always occur challenges the common view in the AB literature,
the ﬁnding is consistent with studies in the spatial attention liter-
ature showing that when a task-relevant stimulus is high in per-
ceptual load, task-irrelevant stimuli presented at nearby
locations have less inﬂuence on behavioral and cortical responses
relative to when the target task is low in perceptual load (e.g., Han-
dy, Soltani, & Mangun, 2001; Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Rees, Frith, & La-
vie, 1997). These ﬁndings have been explained within the context
of models that propose that attention can act to select information
at multiple stages of processing depending on task demands (Lavie,
2005; Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Lavie et al., 2004; Vogel et al., 2005).
According to one model, known as ‘load theory’ (Lavie, 2005; Lavie
& Tsal, 1994; Lavie et al., 2004), changes in the stage at which
selection occurs is determined by the amount of perceptual load
that is required to process task-relevant information. Speciﬁcally,
if processing of the task-relevant information does not require all
perceptual resources, uncommitted resources automatically
‘spill-over’ to the perceptual processing of task-irrelevant informa-
tion thereby allowing this information to be processed more exten-
sively even though it is not directly attended. In contrast, if all
resources are devoted to the task-relevant information, no spare
resources are available for perceptual processing of task-irrelevant
information and thus the extent to task-irrelevant information is
processed beyond the perceptual level is reduced. In other words,
under conditions of low load, the automatic allocation of resources
to task-irrelevant information means that attention effectively se-
lects information at relatively later stages of processing, whereas
under conditions of high load, attention selects information at ear-
lier stages of processing. While the models explaining the effects of
perceptual load are based on empirical studies of the distribution
of selective attention over space, Giesbrecht and colleagues
(2007) proposed that the ﬁnding that T1-load affects whether T2
is processed to a perceptual or post-perceptual level during AB
suggests that perceptual load also modulates the selectivity of
attention over time. In the present work, the proposal that T1-per-
ceptual load modulates post-perceptual processing during the AB
will be referred to as the ‘load hypothesis’.
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Whereas previous studies have shown that task demands con-
strain semantic processing of common words during the AB, the
purpose of the present study was to test the inﬂuence of task de-
mands on the processing of high-priority information presented
during the AB. If the load hypothesis is correct, then not only
should T1-load inﬂuence semantic processing of common words
presented during the AB as the recent evidence suggests (Giesbr-
echt et al., 2007; Vachon et al., 2007), but T1-load should also inﬂu-
ence the extent to which high-priority information survives the AB.
To test this prediction, we conducted three experiments that revis-
ited the classic ﬁnding that personal names survive the AB (Shap-
iro, Caldwell, et al., 1997). To provide a strong test of the
hypothesis, each experiment employed a different manipulation
of T1-load previously used to demonstrate either the inﬂuence of
T1-load on post-perceptual processing during the AB (Experiment
1) or the inﬂuence of load on the spatial selectivity of attention
(Experiments 2 and 3). Regardless of the type of perceptual load,
the prediction is that under conditions of low load, the present
experiments should replicate the ﬁnding that personal names sur-
vive the AB. In contrast, under conditions of high load, the present
experiments should reveal a robust AB for one’s own name. To
anticipate the outcome, the results of each experiment demon-
strate that T1-load modulates the extent to which personal names
survive the AB and thus are consistent with the notion that post-
perceptual processing does not always occur during the AB.3B54H 
MEGAN
F8CSK3 
>> < >> 
+ 
T1-T2 Lag 
200-800 ms 
T1 Arrow 
Left or Right? 
T2 Name 
Male or Female? 
Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the trial sequence. In the trial depicted T1-
load is high.2. Experiment 1
The task used in Experiment 1 was similar to that used by Gies-
brecht et al. (2007) in which participants were presented with two
masked stimuli separated by a variable lag (200–800 ms). The T1
stimulus was a central arrow pointing to the left or right, ﬂanked
by task-irrelevant pairs of arrows pointing in either congruent or
incongruent directions. The congruent and incongruent conditions
will be referred to as the low and high-load conditions, respec-
tively. To test whether T1-load inﬂuences the extent to which
high-priority stimuli survive the AB, T2 was the participant’s
own name or someone else’s name. Participants indicated the
direction of the central arrow (T1) and then the gender of the name
(T2). T2 accuracy in the dual-task condition was compared to a sin-
gle task control where subjects reported the gender of the name
only. The prediction was that personal names should survive the
AB under conditions of low T1-load, but that personal names
should be subject to the AB under conditions of high T1-load.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)
undergraduates participated in a 45-min session for class credit
(mean age = 20; 12 female; all right handed).
2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
All stimuli were viewed from a distance of 110 cm on a 19-in.
color monitor (1024  768; 75 Hz refresh rate) with neutral gray
background. Presentation timing was controlled using MATLAB
(Mathworks, Inc., Boston, MA) and the Psychophysics Toolbox
(Brainard, 1997). T1 stimuli were white and consisted of a central
arrow (0.4  0.4) centered between two pairs of arrows
(0.4  1.1). The distance between adjacent arrows was 0.15. T2
stimuli were personal names obtained from each participant at
the beginning of the session and from the database of registered
birth names available from the US Social Security Administration(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/babynames/). The 50 most
popular male and female names were selected from the most com-
mon year of birth of our sample (1987). All names were presented
in black uppercase 32 point Arial font. Each character subtended
0.4  0.4. Mask stimuli were strings of black numbers and upper-
case letters of the same font and the same length as the respective
target.
2.1.3. Design
There were four independent variables: Number of tasks, T1-
load, T2-name, and T1–T2 lag. The number of tasks was manipu-
lated by instructing subjects to respond to T1 and T2 (dual-task)
or T2 only (single-task). T1-load was manipulated by the direction
of the ﬂankers relative to the central arrow and was either low (i.e.,
>>>>> or <<<<<) or high (i.e., <<><< or >><>>). T2 was either the
participant’s own name or someone else’s name. The participant’s
own name appeared on 25% of the trials, which matched the fre-
quency of occurrence with previous studies showing that personal
names survive the AB (Shapiro, Caldwell, et al., 1997). The tempo-
ral lag between T1 and T2 ranged from 200 to 800 ms in steps of
120 ms. The number of tasks was manipulated between subjects
(n = 12 per condition). All other factors were manipulated within
subjects. The T1-load conditions were presented in separate blocks
of trials and the order was counterbalanced across subjects. The
T1-load conditions were blocked primarily so that the low-load
condition of the present experiment was as similar to the experi-
ment reported by Shapiro, Caldwell, et al. (1997), but also because
previous studies of the AB have shown that randomly intermixing
trials with varying levels of difﬁculty can bias subjects to assume
that all trials will be difﬁcult, which may inﬂuence the magnitude
of the AB for personal names on low-load trials (Shore, McLaughlin,
& Klein, 2001). T2-name and T1–T2 lag were combined factorially
and randomly intermixed within a block of trials. Participants com-
pleted 10 practice trials and then 480 trials divided into 10 blocks.
2.1.4. Procedure
The participant initiated each trial started by pressing the space
bar. After a variable delay (500–1000 ms), T1 appeared and then it
was masked (duration = 53.3 ms; T1-mask ISI = 53.3 ms). After the
lag elapsed, T2 was presented and then masked (40 ms; T2-mask
ISI = 40 ms). On half the trials T2 was a male name and on the other
half it was a female name. At the end of the trial, participants were
prompted to give their responses. In the dual-task condition, they
indicated the direction of the central arrow (left or right) and then
the gender of the name (male or female); in the single-task condi-
tion, they indicated the gender of the name only. All responses
were unspeeded and typed into the keyboard. After the responses,
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quence is illustrated in Fig. 1.
2.2. Results and discussion
Mean proportion of correct T1 responses in the dual-task condi-
tion is shown in Fig. 2. Accuracy was higher in the low-load (0.96)
condition than in the high-load (0.81) condition (F(1,11) = 20.22,
p < 0.001). Performance on the T1 task was not affected by whether
T2 was the subject’s own name or someone else’s name
(own = 0.88 vs. other = 0.89; F(1,11) = 1.81, p > 0.2) nor the interac-
tion between T1-load and T2-name (F < 1).0.5
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Fig. 2. Mean proportion of correct T1 responses observed in Experiment 1 plotted
as a function of T1-load and T2-name. Error bars represent the standard error of the
mean (Loftus & Masson, 1994).Mean proportion of correct T2 responses in the single and
dual-task conditions is shown in Fig. 3. Mean accuracy in the
single-task condition was based on all trials, whereas the mean
accuracy in the dual-task condition was computed based on tri-
als in which T1 was identiﬁed correctly. On visual inspection of
the data shown in Fig. 3, one can clearly observe four main ef-
fects. First, overall accuracy was higher in the single-task condi-
tion than in the dual-task condition (single = 0.97 vs.
dual = 0.88; F(1,22) = 14.34, p < 0.001). Second, increasing T1-
load reduced overall T2 accuracy from 0.95 in the low-load con-
dition to 0.90 in the high-load condition (F(1,22) = 15.78,
p < 0.001). Third, T2 accuracy improved monotonically as a func-
tion of lag (F(5,110) = 15.19, p < 0.001). Finally, overall accuracy
was modulated by T2-name (F(1,22) = 62.80, p < 0.001), such
that observers were more likely to correctly discriminate the
T2 gender when the target was the subject’s own name (0.96)
relative to when it was someone else’s name (0.89). Impor-
tantly, visual inspection of the data shown in Fig. 3 also reveals
that these main effects were qualiﬁed by three signiﬁcant inter-
actions that are critical to the present hypothesis. First, there
was an overall task  lag interaction, such that there was little
or no effect of lag in the single-task condition, but a large effect
of lag in the dual-task (F(5,110) = 5.22, p < 0.001). This interac-
tion is indicative of a robust AB. Second, the task  lag interac-
tion was modulated by load, such that that the difference
between the single- and dual-task conditions was largest under
conditions of high load, particularly at short lags
(F(5,110) = 3.69, p < 0.005). This three-way interaction indicates
that the AB was more severe under conditions of high T1-load.
Finally, there was an interaction between task, load, lag, and T2-
name (F(5,110) = 2.58, p < 0.04). This interaction was such that
under conditions of low T1-load, there was no difference be-
tween the single- and dual-task conditions when T2 was the
subjects’ own name, but a large difference when T2 was some-920
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conditions of high load, single- and dual-task conditions were
maximally different at short lags, regardless of T2-name.
To further clarify the inﬂuence of T1-load on the severity of
the AB, we performed an analysis of AB magnitude. The compu-
tation of AB magnitude quantiﬁes the overall severity of the dec-
rement in T2 accuracy and controls for the differences in
perceptual difﬁculty that are independent of the attention-
dependent effect of lag. This analysis was performed using the
method reported by Jackson and Raymond (2006), in which each
individuals’ level of performance at the lag producing the mini-
mum level performance in the group mean is subtracted from
an optimal performance baseline. In the present work this com-
putation was done in each load condition using accuracy from
the single-task control condition at the corresponding lag as
the performance baseline. The results of this analysis are shown
in Fig. 4. Consistent with previous studies of the AB showing that
the severity of the impairment is modulated by T1 difﬁculty (e.g.,
Jolicoeur, 1998, 1999; Seiffert & Di Lollo, 1997), the magnitude of
the AB in the present work was larger when T1-load was high
than when T1-load was low (0.22 vs. 0.12; F(1,11) = 8.38,
p < 0.02). There was also a trend towards a larger AB in the
T2-other name condition relative to the T2-own name condition
(0.20 vs. 0.14; F(1,11) = 3.78, p < 0.08). More critically, there was
a signiﬁcant interaction between T1-load and T2-name, such that
when T1-load was low, there was a robust AB for someone else’s
name, but not for one’s own name. Indeed, a separate t-test re-
vealed that the magnitude of the AB for one’s own name was not
signiﬁcantly different than zero (t(11) = 1.92, p > 0.08). In con-
trast, when T1-load was high, there was a robust AB for both
types of name.2 In other words, consistent with the load hypoth-
esis, under conditions of low load there was an AB for someone
else’s name, but not for one’s own name; whereas under condi-
tions of high load, there was an AB for both types of name.
3. Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test the load hypothesis
using a manipulation of T1-load directly based on models that ac-
count for the inﬂuence of perceptual load on the spatial selectivity
of attention. The most prominent of these models the load theory2 It is worth noting parenthetically that the ﬁnding that personal names are not
always processed automatically is not novel. Indeed, even in Moray’s (1959) original
study, only one third of the subjects noticed their own name on the unattended
channel, a result that has been replicated more recently by Wood and Cowan (1995).of selective attention (for a recent review of this model see Lavie,
2005). According to this theory, one of the key determinants of per-
ceptual load is the number of items that need to be perceptually
identiﬁed.3 In Experiment 2 we used this deﬁnition to determine
the manipulation of load. Speciﬁcally, we changed the T1 task to a
parity judgment task in which perceptual load was manipulated
by changing the number of items that had to be identiﬁed. In the
low-load condition, the T1 stimulus was a row of equals signs with
a single number in the middle of the row (e.g., ==5==) and the task
was to indicate the parity of the digit. In the high-load condition, the
T1 stimulus was a row of equals signs with two numbers on either
end (e.g., 5===4) and the task was to indicate whether the parity
of the digits was the same or different. According to load theory,
comparing the parity of two numbers, which requires both numbers
to be identiﬁed, should be higher in perceptual load than determin-
ing the parity of a single number (e.g., Lavie, 2005). Despite this
change to the T1 task, the prediction was the same as in Experiment
1: there should be an AB for one’s own name under conditions of
high load, but not under conditions of low load.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Sixteen UCSB undergraduates participated in a 45-min session
for class credit (mean age = 19; 12 female; 1 left handed).
3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
T1 was either a single digit ﬂanked by two pairs of equals signs
(e.g., ==4==) or it was a pair of digits separated by three equals
signs (e.g., 8===6). The target stimulus was black and subtended
0.4  2.6. T2 and the mask stimuli were created in the same man-
ner as Experiment 1.
3.1.3. Design
The independent variables in this experiment were: T1-load,
T1–T2 lag, and T2-name. T1-load was either low or high. In the
low-load condition, T1 was a single digit ﬂanked by pairs of equals
signs; in the high-load condition, T1 was two digits separated by
three equals signs. T1–T2 lag was either 320, 400, or 920 ms. Third,
T2 was either the subject’s own name or someone else’s name. All
variables were manipulated within subjects. The T1-load condi-
tions were presented in different blocks of trials (order counterbal-
anced), whereas T1–T2 lag and T2-name were randomly
intermixed within a block of trials.
3.1.4. Procedure
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the following
exceptions. First, subjects always responded to both T1 and T2. Be-
cause only the dual-task condition was included, the effect of T1–
T2 lag will be used as an index of the AB (e.g., Chun & Potter, 1995).
Second, on low-load trials subjects indicated the parity of the sin-
gle digit and then the gender of the name; on high-load trials they
indicated whether the parity of the two digits was the same or dif-
ferent and then the gender of the name. Third, to ensure T2 perfor-
mance was not at ceiling, overall T2 accuracy was titrated using
visual noise dots (e.g., Giesbrecht, Bischof, & Kingstone, 2003). At
the start of the experiment, every T2 stimulus included 30 black
dots (5 pixel diameter) randomly positioned over the name. After
24 trials, if T2 accuracy (collapsed across all conditions) was above3 This deﬁnition perceptual load is only one of several that have been proposed by
vie and her colleagues (e.g., Lavie, 2005; Lavie et al., 2004). The purpose of adopting
is deﬁnition here is to provide a touchstone to the previous work and is not meant
imply that we are assuming that this is the only deﬁnition of perceptual load.
deed, the concept of perceptual load has yet to be deﬁned precisely both at the
ehavioral and neural level.La
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Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 2. (a) Mean proportion of correct T1 responses plotted as a function of T1-load and T2-name. (b) Mean proportion of correct T2|T1 responses in
plotted as a function of T1-load, T2-name, and T1–T2 lag. (c) Mean proportion AB magnitude plotted as a function of T1-load and T2-name.
4 Although the use of the longest lag in the dual-task condition as the performance
baseline in the computation of AB magnitude is different than in Experiment 1, it is
precisely the baseline used by Jackson and Raymond (2006). The difference in
baselines between Experiments 1 and 2 is likely the cause of the overall differences in
magnitude between the two experiments. For completeness, we performed an
additional analysis on the results of Experiment 1, using the longest lag in the dual-
task condition as the performance baseline in the computation of AB magnitude
Importantly, although the change in baseline resulted in an overall AB magnitude tha
was smaller than the original analysis, the magnitude in this second analysis was
similar to that observed in Experiment 2 and, more importantly, despite the change in
the baseline the interaction between T1-load and T2-name remained.
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by 10; if accuracy was below 66.7% (16 correct out of 24), then the
number of dots was reduced by 10. It is important to note that be-
cause this procedure collapsed across all conditions, it is possible
that some individual conditions could fall outside of the 66.7–
87.5% range.
3.2. Results and discussion
Mean proportion of correct T1 responses is shown in Fig. 5a.
Overall accuracy was 0.92 and participants were more accurate
in the low-load condition than in the high-load condition (0.94
vs. 0.88; F(1,15) = 13.01, p < 0.003). T1-accuracy was neither af-
fected by T2-name nor by the T1-load  T2-name interaction (both
Fs < 1).
Mean proportion of correct T2 responses given correct identi-
ﬁcation of T1 is shown in Fig. 5b. There were two key results.
First, performance was better at long lags than at short lags
(F(2,30) = 4.64, p < 0.02). Within the context of the present
experiment, in which there is only a dual-task condition, this ef-
fect of lag is indicative of a robust AB. Second, and most criti-
cally, there was a signiﬁcant interaction between T1-load,
name, and lag (F(2,30) = 3.60, p < 0.04), such that under condi-
tions of low load, there was no effect of lag for one’s own name,
but a large effect of lag for someone else’s name; in contrast, un-
der conditions of high load, there was an effect of lag, regardless
of name type. In addition to these key ﬁndings, the analysis of
Experiment 2 also revealed a trend towards lower overall T2
accuracy in the high-load condition than in the low-load condi-
tion (0.74 vs. 0.77; F(1,15) = 4.37, p < 0.06) and that, as in Exper-
iment 1, overall T2 accuracy was better in the own name
condition relative to the other name condition (0.84 vs. 0.65;
F(1,15) = 35.90, p < 0.001).
Again, we performed an additional analysis of AB magnitude. As
in Experiment 1, AB magnitude was computed using the Jackson
and Raymond (2006) method, but because there was no single tar-get control condition, performance at the 920 ms lag served as the
baseline.4 The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 5c. Again, this
analysis clearly revealed the inﬂuence of T1-load on the severity of
the AB for personal names, such that there was a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between T1-load and T2-name (F(1,15) = 5.74, p < 0.04). Consis-
tent with the load hypothesis, this interaction was such that the AB
for the participants’ own name was attenuated relative to the AB for
someone else’s name under conditions of low load, whereas both
names were subject to an AB under conditions of high load.
In addition to providing further support for the load hypothesis,
Experiment 2 also rules out two alternative explanations for the
pattern of results observed in Experiment 1. First, it is possible that
the increased AB for personal names observed in Experiment 1 was
due to subjects restricting their focus of spatial attention tightly on
the location of the central arrow for the duration of the trial. While
this strategy would facilitate exclusion of the distractors, it would
result in much of the T2-name falling outside the focus of atten-
tion. Experiment 2 rules out this possibility because subjects could
not attend to a single location, but rather they had to attend to
more of the T1 stimulus in the high-load condition, permitting
more of the T2 stimulus to fall inside the focus of spatial attention.
Moreover, the hypothesis that a restricted focus of attention was
the cause of the increased AB for personal names in Experiment
1 predicts that an increased AB for personal names should have
been observed in the low-load condition of Experiment 2, where.
t
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ever, no such increase was observed. Second, because in Experi-
ment 1 the ﬂanking distractors were visually similar to the target
and they mapped onto a competing response, it is unclear whether
the source of interference giving rise to the AB for personal names
was due to perceptual conﬂict, response conﬂict, or some combina-
tion of the two. Experiment 2 demonstrates that response conﬂict
is not the sole source of interference because the distractors (i.e.,
equals signs) did not map onto a competing response. Thus, when
the experiments are considered together, they provide strong evi-
dence that the perceptual demands imposed by T1 constrain pro-
cessing of personal names during the AB.
4. Experiment 3
Although load theory posits that the key determinant of percep-
tual load is the number of items that need to be perceptually iden-
tiﬁed (e.g., Lavie, 2005), several studies have shown that other
manipulations can have similar effects on the processing of task-
irrelevant or otherwise unattended information. For instance, Yi,
Woodman, Widdlers, Marois, and Chun (2004) demonstrated that
increasing the perceptual demands of a task using visual noise
caused reductions in neural activity in areas of visual cortex that
were activated by task-irrelevant information under conditions of
low perceptual demand. Borrowing from this work, Experiment 3
tested the load hypothesis of post-perceptual processing during
the AB by manipulating T1-load using visual noise. The T1-task
was the same as the high-load condition of Experiment 2, except
that T1 stimulus could be presented alone or embedded in a vari-
able amount of visual noise. Based on the results of Experiment 2,
the parity task should result in a robust AB for personal names
even without visual noise. Thus, the key question in Experiment
3 is whether the additional perceptual demands caused by the
noise dots will result in additional modulations in the severity of
the AB for personal names.Pr
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different, but cover the same range so as to facilitate comparison of the effect of dots a4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Fifteen UCSB undergraduates participated in a 45-min session
for class credit (mean age = 20; 6 female; 13 right handed).
4.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
T1 was a pair of digits separated by three equals signs (e.g.,
8===6). The target stimulus was black and subtended 0.4  2.6.
T2 and the mask stimuli were created in the same manner as
Experiment 1.
4.1.3. Design
There were three independent variables. First, T1-load was
manipulated by presenting black noise dots (5 pixel diameter) in
random locations over the T1 stimulus. There were four levels of
dots: 0, 20, 40, and 60. These noise levels were selected based on
the results of a pilot study in which a separate group of subjects
performed the T1 task in isolation. Second, T2 was the subject’s
own name or someone else’s name. Third, T1–T2 lags were 320,
400, and 920 ms. T1-dots, T2-name, and T1–T2 lag were combined
factorially and randomly intermixed within the experimental
blocks. Subjects participated in 10 blocks of 48 trials.
4.1.4. Procedure
All aspects of the procedure were the same as the high-load
condition of Experiment 2.
4.2. Results and discussion
Mean proportion of correct T1 responses is shown as a function
of the number of noise dots in Fig. 6a. As revealed by visual inspec-
tion of the data, T1-accuracy declined monotonically as the num-
ber of dots increased (F(3,42) = 80.20, p < 0.001). This pattern of
performance was not affected by the type of name that was pre-200 920
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as a function of T1-load and T2-name. (b) Mean proportion of correct T2 responses
ame was large, but did not interact with lag or the number of dots, the y-axes are
nd lag. (c) Mean AB magnitude plotted as a function of T1-load and T2-name.
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(both F’s < 1).
Mean proportion of correct T2 responses given correct identiﬁ-
cation of T1 is shown in Fig. 6b. There were three main effects.
First, performance was better at long lags than at short lags
(F(2,28) = 27.17, p < 0.001), indicative of a robust AB. Second, there
was an effect of T2-name (F(1,14) = 52.28, p < 0.001), such that
people were more accurate overall when T2 was their own name
than when it was someone else’s name. Critically, there was an ef-
fect of T1-load, such that performance was worse when there were
more dots on T1 (F(3,42) = 3.14, p < 0.04). None of the interactions
were signiﬁcant.
As with the previous experiments, an analysis of AB magnitude
was performed. The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 6c.
The only reliable effect was a signiﬁcant increase in the magnitude
of the AB for both types of name as the number of T1-dots in-
creased (F(3,42) = 3.94, p < 0.02). Interestingly, the monotonic in-
crease in AB magnitude that occurred as the number of T1-noise
dots increased mirrored the observed monotonic decrease in T1
performance. Thus, the present experiment supports the load
hypothesis that perceptual load constrains post-perceptual pro-
cessing during the AB.5. General discussion
The purpose of the three experiments reported here was to
investigate the inﬂuence of T1 perceptual load on the processing
of high-priority, personally salient information presented during
the AB. Each experiment employed a different manipulation of
T1 perceptual load and measured the resulting impact on the mag-
nitude of the AB for personal names. In Experiment 1, T1-load was
manipulated using a ﬂanker task. The results demonstrated that
under conditions of low load, there was no AB for one’s own name,
but that under conditions of high T1-load there was a robust AB for
one’s own name. In Experiment 2, T1-load was manipulated by
varying the number of items that had to be identiﬁed. Again, there
was an AB for personal names under conditions of high load, but
not under conditions of low load. Finally, in Experiment 3 T1-load
was manipulated using visual noise dots and the results demon-
strated that as the amount of visual noise increased, the magnitude
of the AB for personal names also increased. These experiments
provide data that are consistent with the load hypothesis that pos-
its that increased T1 perceptual load constrains processing of sub-
sequently presented high-priority information during the AB,
while at the same time replicating previous studies that reported
that high-priority information can survive the AB (Mack et al.,
2002; Shapiro, Caldwell, et al., 1997).
In addition to providing strong support for the hypothesis that
the perceptual demands imposed by T1 limit post-perceptual pro-
cessing of high-priority information during the AB, the present re-
sults dove-tail with recent studies showing that semantic and
perceptual processing of more mundane stimuli can also be con-
strained during the AB. These studies include the ﬁnding that the
N400 can be suppressed under conditions of high T1-load (Giesbr-
echt et al., 2007) and the ﬁnding that switches of task set reduces
semantic processing of T2 (Vachon et al., 2007). As a compliment to
these recent studies showing that semantic processing can be im-
paired during the AB, other recent ERP work suggests that stages of
perceptual processing that occur prior to the extraction of meaning
may, under some conditions, be delayed. These studies have fo-
cused on the N2pc (N2 posterior contralateral) ERP component,
which is thought to reﬂect processes involved in the allocation of
perceptual processing resources to facilitate selection of a target
from amongst distractors (e.g., Eimer, 1996; Luck & Hillyard,
1994; Woodman & Luck, 1999). In several studies, Jolicoeur andcolleagues (Dell’Acqua, Sessa, Jolicoeur, & Robitaille, 2006; Jolico-
eur, Sessa, & Dell’Acqua, 2006a; Jolicoeur, Sessa, Dell’Acqua, &
Robitaille, 2006b) have found that the N2pc evoked by a peripher-
ally presented T2 during the AB is suppressed if distracting stimuli
are also presented simultaneously with the target. Because the
N2pc is thought to reﬂect relatively early (i.e., pre-semantic) stages
of processing, the attenuation of the N2pc component during the
AB suggests that under some conditions perceptual level process-
ing can be compromised during the AB. Thus, the present ﬁndings
showing that T1-load modulates the magnitude of the AB for per-
sonal names and the previously published ﬁndings of modulated
behavioral and electrophysiological indices of semantic and per-
ceptual processing during the AB support the conclusion that infor-
mation presented during the AB is not always processed to a post-
perceptual level.
Besides the convergence with other studies of the AB, the pres-
ent work showing that the temporal distribution of selectivity is
modulated by T1-load converges with studies in the broader
attention literature showing that increased perceptual load mod-
ulates the spatial distribution of selectivity. For instance a large
number of behavioral, electrophysiological, neuroimaging studies
have shown that increases in task-relevant perceptual load re-
duces behavioral interference caused by task-irrelevant stimuli
and that increases in task-relevant load are associated with
reductions in neural activity in areas of cortex that represent
the task-irrelevant information (e.g., Handy et al., 2001; Lavie,
1995; Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Pessoa, McKenna, Guitierrez, & Ungerle-
ider, 2002). Importantly for the present work, these studies dem-
onstrated modulations in the selectivity of spatial attention using
a wide variety of task-irrelevant stimuli ranging from simple let-
ters and shapes (e.g., Handy et al., 2001; Lavie, 1995; Rees et al.,
1997; Vogel et al., 2005) to high-priority, personally salient infor-
mation such as personal names (Harris & Pashler, 2004) and emo-
tional faces (Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa,
McKenna, et al., 2002). The ﬁndings that the spatial and temporal
distribution of post-perceptual processing of task-irrelevant or
otherwise unattended information is affected by load can be ex-
plained by appealing to the load theory of selective attention
(e.g., Lavie 2005). This theory assumes that the perceptual system
devotes all of its available resources to sensory processing.
According to this scheme, if the sensory processing demands
overload the perceptual system, then attention acts to divert re-
sources to task-relevant inputs, resulting in increased selectivity
and reduced inﬂuence of task-irrelevant information. If, however,
the sensory processing demands do not overload the perceptual
system, then resources are allocated not only to task-relevant
information, but also task-irrelevant information. Thus, under
conditions of low load, task-irrelevant information has the poten-
tial to interfere with task-relevant behavior and has the potential
to evoke neural responses. A secondary consideration in this
scheme is that the extent to which task-irrelevant information
is fully identiﬁed at the perceptual level is not only a function
of the demands imposed by processing the task-relevant informa-
tion, but it is also a function perceptual resources required to pro-
cess the task-irrelevant information itself. Speciﬁcally, even if the
system is taxed to a high degree by the task-relevant information,
if the task-irrelevant stimulus happens to require fewer resources
to process at the perceptual stage, as may happen if it is some-
thing with which the observer is highly experienced or that is
personally salient (e.g., one’s own name), then the stimulus will
be more likely to interfere with task-relevant behavior or evoke
neural response relative to stimuli that require more perceptual
resources. Based on this scheme, we argue that while the low-
load T1 tasks were sufﬁcient to cause an AB, they did not com-
pletely deplete the perceptual resources, thereby leaving some re-
sources available for the perceptual processing of T2. Critically, in
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higher when T2 was the subject’s own name than when it was
someone else’s name, suggesting that either because of the re-
peated exposure to our own name or because of it’s personal sal-
ience, or for both reasons, personal names are easier to
perceptually identify than other names and presumably they re-
quire fewer perceptual resources to identify. Thus, even though
the low-load T1 task taxed the system enough to cause an AB
for other names, given the relatively high-level of performance,
it seems likely that the resources were not completely depleted
allowing some resources to spill-over to the processing of T2.
Importantly, according to this scheme we also argue that the
high-load condition was enough to tax the system to the extent
that the perceptual resources were completely depleted, thus,
regardless of name type, it would reduce the likelihood that even
personal names would be fully identiﬁed during the AB.
Appealing to load theory also reconciles the present ﬁndings
with previous studies showing that high-priority information
survives the AB. First and foremost, we argue that T1 task used
by Shapiro, Caldwell, et al. (1997) did not place a severe enough
demand on perceptual selection processes. In the Shapiro, Cald-
well, et al. (1997) paradigm, the T1 task was to name the iden-
tity of the single white word in the display sequence. This word
was always chosen out of a set of 10 possible items and never in
the course of the experiment did it appear as a distractor. The
fact that only a single item was required to be identiﬁed and
there were no other items presented simultaneously with T1,
this task, while sufﬁcient to cause an AB for many stimuli, would
likely be enough to leave minimal resources available to process
a personal name enough for detection. In a similar vein, Mack
et al. (2002) reported that cartoon smiley faces survived the
AB and argued that the saliency of the happy faces permitted
them to be processed without attention. However, as with the
Shapiro, Caldwell, et al. (1997) task, Mack et al. (2002) used a
T1 task in which the stimulus was the only red item in the RSVP
stream. We argue that this task is relatively low in perceptual
demand and when coupled with their ﬁnding that overall dis-
crimination of T2-faces was better than any of the other stimuli
they used, suggest that enough perceptual resources remained
after allocating to the T1 item to process the happy face to the
point of recognition.
Although the present results are consistent with the load
hypothesis, there are three important caveats that are worth
noting. First, it must be emphasized that, we are not proposing
that the AB itself is determined by perceptual load only. Indeed,
there is no question that the AB is sensitive to post-perceptual
factors (e.g., strategic, motivational, response-related, etc.). Sec-
ond, we are also not proposing that perceptual load is the only
factor that serves to reduce post-perceptual processing during
the AB. Third, although load theory provides a general deﬁnition
of perceptual load, this is only one deﬁnition. Indeed, while the
results of Experiment 3 and other studies in the literature (e.g.,
Yi et al., 2004) show patterns that are consistent with load the-
ory, the manipulation of load used to obtain those results (i.e.,
visual noise dots) is not what load theory would precisely de-
ﬁne as perceptual load. Indeed, future work is needed to deﬁne
what precisely constitutes perceptual load at the behavioral and
neural level. These caveats aside, what we are proposing is that,
to the extent the present manipulations of T1-load affect per-
ceptual-level selection, the present results demonstrate that per-
ceptual load is sufﬁcient to modulate the magnitude of the AB
and that perceptual load is sufﬁcient to modulate the extent to
which high-priority information is processed during the AB. Crit-
ically, when the present ﬁndings are considered together with
previous studies showing that the AB is modulated by post-per-
ceptual factors, they converge on the notion that the AB is not aunitary phenomenon (e.g., Kawahara, Enns, & Di Lollo, 2006)
and that it can be modulated by early-stage perceptual factors,
by late-stage central capacity limitations, or by a combination
of the two.
5.1. Implications
A variety of models have been proposed to account for the AB.
Despite their variety, the one commonality of these models is that
each assumes that T2 is always processed to the post-perceptual
level (Chun & Potter, 1995; Di Lollo et al., 2005; Duncan et al.,
1994; Jolicoeur, 1999; Marois et al., 2004; Olivers & Watson,
2006; Raymond, 2003; Shapiro et al., 1994; Vogel et al., 1998).
According to this assumption all stimuli are initially handled by a
high-capacity processor that fully identiﬁes information prior to
selection and consolidation for report in a manner similar to that
proposed by classic late selection models of attention (e.g., Deutsch
& Deutsch, 1963). The present ﬁnding that high-priority informa-
tion does not always survive the AB as well as other ﬁndings show-
ing attenuated semantic processing during the AB challenges the
common theoretical assumption that all information presented
during the AB is processed to a post-perceptual level. However,
all current models of the AB could be modiﬁed to handle the pres-
ent results if is assumed that the resources of the initial high-
capacity processor are not unlimited and that they are allocated
based on the principles of load theory. In other words, if the per-
ceptual load of the T1 task overloads the initial processing stage,
then automatic post-perceptual processing of T2 would be pre-
vented. If the initial processing stage is not exceeded, then post-
perceptual processing of T2 would proceed to the extent afforded
by the available perceptual resources and by the nature of the T2
stimulus. Importantly, the dynamics of this process would occur
independent of the speciﬁc functional limitation implicated by
each theory of the AB. As a result, the primary implication of the
present work with respect to models of the AB is to more com-
pletely specify the models rather than to discriminate between
them.
Beyond the scope of the AB, the ﬁnding that the extent to
which personal names survive the AB depends on task demands
supports theoretical frameworks that suggest that attentional
selection can occur at either perceptual or post-perceptual stages
of processing (Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Lavie et al., 2004; Vogel et al.,
2005; Yantis & Johnston, 1990; Yi et al., 2004). These frameworks
are supported by functional neuroimaging and neurophysiological
studies showing that attention inﬂuences processing at almost
every stage of visual processing, from high-order association
areas to the lateral geniculate nucleus (Astaﬁev et al., 2003; Chel-
azzi, Miller, Duncan, & Desimone, 1993; Corbetta et al., 1990;
Hopﬁnger, Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Moore & Fallah, 2004;
Noesselt et al., 2002; O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002).
Thus, in contrast to the debate between traditional early (Broad-
bent, 1958, 1971) and late selection views of attention (Deutsch &
Deutsch, 1963), this recent work suggests that visual attention is
not ﬁxed at either early or late stages of processing, but rather
that attention is a multi-level selection process that can change
ﬂexibly depending on task demands and behavioral goals (Kast-
ner & Pinsk, 2004; Lavie, 2005; Lavie & Tsal, 1994; Lavie et al.,
2004; Vogel et al., 2005; Yantis & Johnston, 1990; Yi et al.,
2004). Whereas much of the previous work offered in support
of this ﬂexible selection view has come from studies demonstrat-
ing that concurrent task demands modulate the selectivity of
attention over space, the present work coupled with other emer-
gent evidence from the AB literature (e.g., Dell’Acqua et al., 2006;
Giesbrecht et al., 2007; Jolicoeur et al., 2006a, 2006b; Vachon
et al., 2007) demonstrates that perceptual demands also impact
the selectivity of attention over time.
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